Lovely framing—two complements, not objections. For most of the post-Soviet era the reconquista impulse was actually fringe; relations were mostly pragmatic and transactional. And the sharpest expansionist turns line up suspiciously well with dips in Putin's approval—Crimea followed the 2011–12 protests, then sent his ratings back above eighty. Culture may set the menu, but the timing looks driven by regime survival.
Thanks for this, and for the generous framing. The Crimea rally is real. Levada has Putin going from about 64 percent before to 82 after. But 2008 breaks the pattern. He invaded Georgia at 86 to 88 percent, his career peak. There was no dip to escape.
Crimea has the same issue. The bump came after the seizure. The trigger came weeks before it: Yanukovych fell, and the Sevastopol base was exposed. The 2011 protests were two years gone. If diversion drove it, why wait for Kyiv to force the moment?
The menu is cultural. The timing is reactive, set by events on Russia's border.
Excellent essay on the cultural perspective of geo politics. And nice and short. I appreciate that.
Please consider the impact of the culture of the people and its affect on Putin. That is... the possibility of riots or assassination and the effect of Putin's recognition of those possibilities. There's only so much a tyrant can do to limit access to the entertainment culture of the west and leaking through those channels is recognition that they are not free.
Thanks, Walter. That pressure is real, and Putin acts like he knows it. The 2011 protests rattled him, and a chunk of the Crimea playbook was about turning that internal threat outward. A foreign win buys approval at home. But you're pointing at the long-run leak: he can throttle the channels, not the awareness. That gap between the official story and what people can see is the pressure he can manage but never close.
Yes. Canada was space (buffer) between the US and Russia in terms of missiles. I suspect Canada, a nation that makes a real effort to do the right thing, would still intercept, as best it could, any Russian missiles coming for the U.S. More realistically, with the Arctic opening as a viable sea lane, Canada becomes far more important to the US.
Lovely framing—two complements, not objections. For most of the post-Soviet era the reconquista impulse was actually fringe; relations were mostly pragmatic and transactional. And the sharpest expansionist turns line up suspiciously well with dips in Putin's approval—Crimea followed the 2011–12 protests, then sent his ratings back above eighty. Culture may set the menu, but the timing looks driven by regime survival.
Thanks for this, and for the generous framing. The Crimea rally is real. Levada has Putin going from about 64 percent before to 82 after. But 2008 breaks the pattern. He invaded Georgia at 86 to 88 percent, his career peak. There was no dip to escape.
Crimea has the same issue. The bump came after the seizure. The trigger came weeks before it: Yanukovych fell, and the Sevastopol base was exposed. The 2011 protests were two years gone. If diversion drove it, why wait for Kyiv to force the moment?
The menu is cultural. The timing is reactive, set by events on Russia's border.
Excellent essay on the cultural perspective of geo politics. And nice and short. I appreciate that.
Please consider the impact of the culture of the people and its affect on Putin. That is... the possibility of riots or assassination and the effect of Putin's recognition of those possibilities. There's only so much a tyrant can do to limit access to the entertainment culture of the west and leaking through those channels is recognition that they are not free.
Thanks, Walter. That pressure is real, and Putin acts like he knows it. The 2011 protests rattled him, and a chunk of the Crimea playbook was about turning that internal threat outward. A foreign win buys approval at home. But you're pointing at the long-run leak: he can throttle the channels, not the awareness. That gap between the official story and what people can see is the pressure he can manage but never close.
United States lost it’s buffer. Canada.
Yes. Canada was space (buffer) between the US and Russia in terms of missiles. I suspect Canada, a nation that makes a real effort to do the right thing, would still intercept, as best it could, any Russian missiles coming for the U.S. More realistically, with the Arctic opening as a viable sea lane, Canada becomes far more important to the US.