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Way Yuhl's avatar

You raise legitimate cautions, but they point to misuse rather than a flaw in the framework itself.

Tightness–looseness does not deny political agency. Gelfand’s research is clear that perceived threat drives tightness, and that perception can be deliberately manufactured. Authoritarian leaders exploit this precisely because tight cultures are easier to govern through compliance. Explaining that mechanism does not legitimize oppression; it makes the manipulation visible.

The ecological fallacy risk is real, but it applies to all national-level cultural models. National averages are heuristics, not operational rules. A Japanese startup being looser than an American bank does not invalidate the framework; it shows why analysis must move from national culture to institutional and functional context.

On creativity, the evidence supports your refinement. Tight cultures constrain radical disruption but excel at incremental, process-driven innovation. Japan’s long dominance in hardware and automotive engineering fits this pattern exactly.

Your final point is the most important: tightness–looseness works best as a dial, not a label. High-performing systems are typically tight on values and strategy, and loose on execution. Used diagnostically rather than categorically, the framework explains friction without creating stereotypes.

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Way Yuhl's avatar

Interesting article. Thanks for the link. In many ways, writing about the same subject with a name change social norms for cultural perspectives.

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Peter Jansen's avatar

Your framework implies that external threats cause tightness. It ignores political agency. Leaders can manufacture tightness by fabricating threats to consolidate power. Tightness is not always an evolutionary adaptation; it is often a political weapon.Viewing an authoritarian regime's tightness as "natural" or "necessary" legitimizes oppression rather than identifying it as a governance choice

The application of the theory faces significant risks. If you use this blindly, you will make mistakes. For example if you take the "National Average" Trap (Ecological Fallacy)

​The theory assigns a single score to a massive entity (e.g., "The USA is Loose"). This is statistically true but operationally useless for specific contexts.

​The Flaw is that a tech startup in "Tight" Japan may be looser than a bank in "Loose" America.

​You risk to assume a US partner is flexible, only to run into a "Tight" legal compliance team that kills the deal. The national average hides the functional reality.

Your theory also posits that Tightness kills creativity. This is a half-truth. Tight cultures struggle with radical disruption (0 to 1 innovation), but they excel at incremental innovation (1 to 100 refinement).the evidence is in Japan (Tight) dominated global innovation in hardware and automotive engineering for decades through process perfection, not chaotic looseness.

I would suggest to NOT use T-L as a lable but rather as a dial. Use it to diagnose friction rather than to create stereotypes.

The most successful entities are Tight on Strategy/Values but Loose on Execution/Tactics. They define where they are going rigidly, but are flexible on how to get there.

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Alister Martin's avatar

Noting how cultural tightness and looseness influence compliance and social pressures. It highlights a structural challenge for policy design that “The Operator's Playbook: How Social Norms Can Impact Your Change Initiatives” directly addresses by urging precision in how and when social norms are leveraged to change behavior: https://open.substack.com/pub/buildingahealthierdemocracy/p/the-operators-playbook-how-social?utm_campaign=post-expanded-share&utm_medium=web

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